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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 40808-2013
Bonner County Case
No. CV-2012-0964
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner
THE HONORABLE JEFF M. BRODIE, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
John A. Finney
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Susan K. Servick
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
618 North 4th Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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REPLY ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

THERE IS ONLY ONE DRIVER'S LICENSE INVOLVED
The Petitioner/Appellant Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of

Bonner County, Idaho and on December 2, 2009 held an Idaho
driver's license, which was a Class A COL.

For the same reasons

stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner v. State, Dept. of
Transp., 150 Idaho 164, 168 (2011) Peck " ... has only one driver's
license, a Class A COL."

The Title 18 ALS suspension that Peck

has served was a suspension of Peck's " ... driving privileges in
toto, while the 49-335 suspension only applies to a particular
subset of driving privileges, i.e.,
commercial vehicle."

II.

[the] right to operate a

Wanner, 150 Idaho at 170.

THE PENALTIES ALL FLOW FROM THE TRAFFIC STOP
The Respondent's Brief is inaccurate in the assertion that

"Generally, Idaho Code § 18-8002A prescribes the penalties
governing all aspects of a motorist's driving privileges in the
event that a motorist submits to, but fails evidentiary testing."
P. 6.

Both Idaho Code § 18-8002A and Idaho Code § 49-335 govern

aspects of a motorists driving privileges when an evidentiary test
is failed.
The evidentiary testing itself is solely based upon the
suspected criminal conduct.

There is no basis for either the §

18-8002A penalty or the § 49-335 penalty other than the suspected
criminal conduct.

Another way to look at it is that there is no

independent basis from the suspected criminal conduct for
obtaining the evidentiary testing results upon which Idaho Code §
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49-335(2) is dependent.

The constitutional protections afforded

Peck apply to the evidentiary testing and are the basis for the
requirement of implied consent.

As set forth in the Appellant's

Brief, implied consent requires that the tests be administered
after constitutionally required information is provided to the
driver, which is informed consent.

III. THERE IS NO CHARGE OR ACTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
The Respondent asserts in the Respondent's Brief at page 7
that Federal Regulation 49 C.F.R. 383.51 results in the
disqualification of Petitioner Peck's COL.

First, the Petitioner

Peck was not charged with violating any Federal Regulation and the
Respondent admits that the Federal Regulation actually only
applies in determining whether a State qualifies for federal
highway funding based upon the driving laws the State enacts.
Second, when one reads the provision of 49 C.F.R. 383.51 relied
upon, the regulation seeks to compel the State of Idaho to adopt
legislation in the event of a conviction of driving under the
influence.

The regulation does not seek to compel the State of

Idaho to adopt legislation in the event of taking and failing an
evidentiary test.

The State of Idaho, in adopting Idaho Code §

49-335, went beyond the conviction provision in the Federal
Regulation required for highway funding, and attempted to make the
failing of an evidentiary test a grounds for a one year COL
disqualification.

In order for evidentiary testing to be used for

the COL disqualification, the testing must meet constitution
exception to the warrant requirement of "implied consent" as set
forth in the Appellant's Brief.
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The Federal Regulation cited and urged is irrelevant to the
inquiry in this matter.

Idaho Code § 49-335 is the only

applicable provision regarding Peck and the COL disqualification
sought by the State.

IV.

PRESUMING TO KNOW THE LAW DOES NOT DO AWAY WITH THE
CONSTIUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
While the Appellant Peck is presumed to know the consequences

of failing and taking an evidentiary test, the constitutional
requirements for warrant still apply.

If there is no warrant,

there must be an exception to the warrant requirement which is
met.

The exception relied upon by the State of Idaho is implied

consent.

In order to have implied consent, one must be informed

of the consequences (informed consent).

The information must

accurately notify the driver of the substantive consequences of
the testing.

Here it is undisputed that the legislative form used

does not meet all the substantive consequences of the evidentiary
testing.

The form only informs of some of the consequences.

While the form informs of the substance of the ALS suspension it
does not inform of the substance of the COL disqualification.
Therefore, there is no informed consent and therefore no implied
consent necessary to impose the COL disqualification.
If just the presumption of knowing the consequences of taking
and failing an evidentiary test was constitutionally sufficient,
there would be no need to inform a driver of the ALS suspension
consequences to impose and uphold the ALS suspension (18-8002A).
While the information given may have been sufficient to sustain
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the ALS suspension (18-8002A), the infor.mation given to Peck was
insufficient to sustain the CDL disqualification (49-335).
The Wyoming authority cited by the District Court and the
Respondent is clearly distinguishable.

Apparently in Wyoming,

implied consent has not been interpreted to require being informed
of the consequences for the implied consent to be valid.

In

Idaho, the legislature's provision for informing the driver is
based upon the Idaho cases which hold that the Constitutional
provisions require such information be given to meet the
warrantless search and seizure exception.

The statutory

infor.mation requirements must meet the constitutional mandates.
When the legislature added the Idaho Code disqualification
provisions, i t did not amend its information requirement
provisions.

That lack of infor.mation is constitutionally

defective.
The Notice (which was created when there were only

~T.S

suspension penalties) actually provided to Peck gave contrary
statements and information to Peck compared to the CDL
disqualification.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner, 150 Idaho at

166, framed the issue as follows:
The Notice did not address the situation presented by the
underlying facts of this case: the consequences of refusing
or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL who
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of
contact with law enforcement. This is significant because
I.C. § 49-335(2) provides that a motorist who fails
evidentiary testing is disqualified from operating a
commercial vehicle for not less than one year.
For the ALS suspension to be upheld, Idaho law does require
the driver be informed of all the ALS consequences.

The Peck

appellate decision on the ALS suspension only stands for the
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proposition that the CDL disqualification consequences do not need
to be given for the ALS suspension to be upheld.

Here, the

Appellant Peck asserts that for the CDL disqualification to be
upheld, he (the driver) must have been informed of the CDL
disqualification consequences.

This is because the evidentiary

testing is based upon implied consent.

Without accurate and

adequate notice, there is no implied consent. Without implied
consent, the evidentiary testing cannot result in a license
suspension or a license disqualification.
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CONCLUSION
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, based upon either
substantive due process or procedural due process (or both,
although not required), the Title 49 Notice of Disqualification
("CDL disqualification") served upon Peck must be vacated and set
aside.

Both the hearing officer's decision and the District

Court's decision should be vacated as the notice of
disqualification (a) violates statutory or constitutional
provisions;

(b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority;

made upon unlawful procedure;

(c) is

(d) is not supported by substantial

evidence in the record; and/or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.
The relief sought is to vacate and set aside the
disqualification of Peck's COL driving privileges, to reinstate
the driving privileges, and for an award to the Appellant of
attorney fees and costs against the Respondent.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~ day

of September, 2013.

INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant PECK
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~~day of September, 2013,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to:
Susan K. Servick
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
618 North 4th Street
P.O. Box 2900
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
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